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Allan Farnsworth was one of the world's great contract and
commercial lawyers. His textbook and separate casebook on
contract law became classics, displaying enormous scholarship
and extraordinary industry. So too did the American Restatement (Second) of Contracts, of which he was the Reporter. Allan
is a huge loss to the Columbia Law School, where he laboured in
the vineyards for over half a century. But his absence will also
be keenly felt elsewhere, not least at UNIDROIT, 1 where he
served with distinction as a member of the Governing Council
for two decades and was a major influence in the shaping of the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts
as a member of the Working Group so admirably chaired by
Professor Michael Joachim Bonell. Allan had a gift for succinctly capturing the commercial realities underlying rule-mak* Emeritus Professor of Law in the University of Oxford and Emeritus Fellow
of St. John's College, Oxford.
1 The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, an international intergovernmental organization based in Rome and devoted to the unification of private law at the international level.
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ing. Writing of dispositive contract rules applicable in default
of contrary agreement by the parties, he commented:
Some default rules are intended to spare parties the cost of negotiating and drafting by providing the rules that they would probably have agreed upon had they taken the time to do so .... But
many default rules have a different purpose. They are not the
rules that the parties would probably have agreed upon; they are
instead rules that will induce the parties - often one of the parties
2
- to negotiate a more suitable rule for the particular transaction.
This would have been the perfect answer to complaints by certain sectors of the leasing industry that the provisions of the
1988 UNIDROIT Convention on International Financial Leasing did not reflect the typical terms of a financial lease.
Allan was much in demand as an arbitrator in international commercial arbitrations, where his commercial grasp and
trenchant style quickly demolished untenable propositions. I
was once privileged to be invited by him and his co-arbitrator to
be the Chairman of a tribunal in an arbitration in which they
were engaged. The applicable law was that of the State of Illinois and the procedure, was governed by the arbitration rules of
the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. The American party sought to have a substantial volume of evidence excluded on the ground that it contravened the
Illinois parol evidence rule. Allan gave a snort of derision - and
that was the end of the argument!
This short piece has no pretensions to profundity; it is written simply as a brief tribute to an outstanding scholar who
could have written it so much better himself.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Much has been written on the relative merits of litigation
and arbitration. Advantages claimed for the latter are party selection of the tribunal, privacy, confidentiality, party control of
the procedure, finality, speed and cost reduction. In relation to
the first five of these, the claims are justified, though with the
caveat that confidentiality and finality may be undermined by
2 E. Allan Farnsworth, An American View of the Principles as a Guide to
Drafting Contracts, in UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS: A NEW LEX MERCATORIA? 87 (1995).
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judicial review, whilst in the case of international commercial
arbitration, at least, it is often far from the case that the proceedings are quicker and less expensive than litigation. 3 What
is interesting, however, is that in the decision whether to select
litigation or arbitration as the mode of dispute resolution, the
focus is almost exclusively on procedure and on the exclusion or
restriction of judicial review. Relatively little attention has
been paid to the potential impact of the choice of arbitration on
the determination of substantive rights in international disputes. In particular, regard should be had to: (1) the determination of the applicable law, (2) the application of "rules of law,"
(3) the effect of failure to apply the applicable law correctly or at
all, (4) the impact of a more relaxed approach to the admissibility of evidence, and (5) recognition and enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award. Of course, the restriction of judicial review remains an important factor to be taken into consideration.
II.

THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL RULES

In evaluating an arbitration clauge providing for institutional arbitration - for example, arbitriation under the aegis of
the International Chamber of Commerce or the London Court of
International Arbitration - it is all too easy to overlook the impact of the institutional rules by which the parties agree to be
bound when submitting their request for arbitration. These
rules, though primarily directed to the appointment of the arbitral tribunal and the conduct of the arbitration, may also contain important provisions which directly or indirectly affect
substantive rights. For example, the determination of the applicable law, the power of the tribunal to draw on non-binding
rules as sources of rights, the admissibility of evidence and the
exclusion of judicial review may be affected. Therefore, institutional rules may, in various ways, expand the power of the tri3 Whereas in judicial proceedings court fees are usually modest and no payment has to be made for the judge or the use of the courtroom, in the typical case
involving a panel of three arbitrators the parties will be responsible for their travel
costs, hotel accommodation, fees of the arbitrators, hire of rooms for the hearing
and, in the case of an institutional arbitration, the fees of the institution administering the arbitration. Moreover, dates have to be fixed which accommodate the
diaries of the three members of the arbitral tribunal, lawyers on both sides, the
parties themselves and witnesses. This can result in substantial delays before the
case is heard.
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bunal and limit the circumstances in which its award may be
4
set aside or refused recognition.

III.

DETERMINATION OF THE APPLICABLE LAW

In cases involving a foreign element, the national judge frequently 5 has to determine what law governs the issue or issues
before the court. For that purpose he is obliged to apply his own
country's rules of private international law. The trend in arbitration is towards giving the arbitral tribunal greater freedom.
This may be enshrined in legislation on arbitration or in institutional rules. Thus, under some of these rules, an arbitral tribunal, while obliged to respect party choice of law, may in the
absence of such choice determine the law applicable to the substance of the dispute in accordance with the conflict rules it considers applicable 6 or appropriate.7 Not all jurisdictions are
quite so liberal. For example, where the seat of the arbitration
is in Switzerland, sectipn 187(1) of the Swiss Private International Law Act 1987 requires the arbitral tribunal to decide the
case in accordance with the rules of law8 with which the case
has the closest connection. This is the approach taken by several other jurisdictions. In neither case, however, is the tribunal required to apply the conflict rules of the seat of the
arbitration itself. This distinguishes the position of an arbitral
tribunal from that of a national judge. So the applicable law as
determined by an arbitral tribunal may well be different from
that determined by a judge under national conflict of laws rules
and may produce an entirely different outcome. However, in all
these cases the tribunal must reach the applicable law through
a conflicts rule. But some jurisdictions allow the tribunal to de4

See infra Parts VI, VII.
5 But not always, because foreign law may not have been pleaded or because
on the point at issue the laws of the different states may be the same.
6 See, e.g., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, art. 28(2) (1994); UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, art. 33(1) (1998); Arbitration Act, 1996, 23, § 46(3) (Eng.).
7

See, e.g.,

TION, art.

INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (ICC) RULES OF ARBITRARULES OF ARBITRATION]; LCIA ARBI-

17(1) (Jan. 1, 1998) [hereinafter ICC

TRATION RULES, art. 22(3) (1998).

8 As to "rules of law," see infra Part IV.
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termine the applicable law directly without going through a
conflicts rule.9
IV.

THE APPLICATION OF "RULES OF LAW"

The traditional conflict of laws doctrine is that only the law
of a state can be selected to govern a transaction or issue. On
this basis, a national court, unless otherwise empowered by its
own law, cannot directly apply the lex mercatoriaor rules based
on a combination of national laws or non-binding rules of law,
such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts (PICC) or the Principles of European Contract Law
(PECL), though these may well serve as a reference point for
the court in deciding in which direction its national law should
develop. It is generally considered that the 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, 10 in its references to "law," applies only to the legal system of a state, not
to non-binding rules of law. However, the impetus in international commercial arbitration to free arbitral tribunals from the
shackles of national law and enable them to draw on sources
offering the best solutions to modern problems has led increasingly to the acceptance of "rules of law." These legal rules are
drawn from a number of legal systems and are evolving as
transnational rules, general principles or lex mercatoria,including formulations in non-binding instruments such as the PICC
and PECL. The ICC Rules of Arbitration provide for the application of rules of law in the following terms:
The parties shall be free to agree upon the rules of law to be applied by the Arbitral Tribunal to the merits of the dispute. In the
absence of any such agreement, the Arbitral Tribunal shall apply
the rules of law which it determines to be appropriate. 1 1
9

See

TRATION IT

FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBI-

1552-53 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999).

10 Now being converted into an EC regulation, an early draft of which would

have empowered the parties, instead of choosing the law of a state, to "choose as
the applicable law the principles and rules of the substantive law of contract
recognised internationally or in the Community." See Proposal for a Regulation of
the European Parliament and the Council on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations (Rome I), com (2005) 650 final (15 December 2005), 914.2. This provision, which would have allowed choice of the PICC and the PECL as the applicable
law, proved too controversial and has been dropped.
11 ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION, supra note 7, art. 17(1).
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There has been an increasing number of references to the
UNIDROIT Principles in ICC awards, and in several of these
cases the Principles have been directly applied as rules of law or
as evidence of custom or usage or to supplement the applicable
12
law.
The concept of rules of law is seen as more responsive than
national law to the needs and practices of international commerce and the identification of best solutions to given problems.
The UNCITRAL Model Law, 13 the Washington Convention, 14
and the arbitration laws of a number of legal systems, including
English law,' 5 permit the parties to choose rules of law but, in
the absence of choice, require the tribunal to apply "law" in the
traditional way. Certain other systems, including French law,
are more liberal, and empower the tribunal to apply the rules of
law it considers appropriate. 16 Either approach gives the arbitrator a wider degree of freedom than that enjoyed by a judge
applying national law and may lead to the application of rules
different from that which the judge would apply and, in consequence, to a different result. So again, the choice of arbitration
as the dispute resolution mechanism may affect not only the
procedure to be followed, but the substantive result of the case.

12

See UNIDROIT

PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS:

REFLECTIONS ON THEIR USE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, A SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE ICC INTERNATIONAL COURT OF ARBITRATION BULLETIN (Int'l Chamber

of Commerce 2002); Emmanuel Jolivet, The UNIDROIT Principles in ICC Arbitra-

tion, in UNIDROIT

PRINCIPLES: NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND APPLICATIONS, ICC INTERNATIONAL COURT OF ARBITRATION BULLETIN 2005 SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT (Int'l

Chamber of Commerce 2006).
13 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, art.

28(2) (1994).

14 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Washington 1965 [hereinafter Washington Convention]. See infra Part VI.
15 Arbitration Act, 1996, 23, § 46(1)(b) (Eng.). This does not use the phrase
"rules of law" but, after referring to the law chosen by the parties, empowers the
tribunal, if the parties so agree, to decide the dispute in accordance with "such
other considerations as are agreed by them or determined by the tribunal", which
goes even wider than rules of law and enables the parties to give the tribunal
power to decide ex aequo et bono.
16 New Code of Civ. Pro., art. 1496.
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V.

EVIDENCE

The admissibility of evidence in proceedings before a court
is governed by the law of evidence, which may impose constraints on what can be admitted. Thus, many common law systems have or have had rules excluding the admissibility of
hearsay evidence, 17 secondary evidence, such as a copy of a document when the original is available,' and parol evidence.' 9
Though in modern times rules of this kind are of reduced importance, they may nevertheless from time to time operate to exclude evidence which, if admitted, might have led to a different
outcome of the case. Arbitrators, however, are not bound by
such rules except so far as the parties themselves agree to apply
them. In practice, the strong tendency in arbitration is not to
apply exclusionary rules but to evaluate the weight, rather than
the admissibility, of evidence. Article 34(2)(f) of the English Arbitration Act leaves it to the tribunal to decide whether to apply
strict rules of evidence (or any other rules) as to the admissibility, relevance or weight of any material (oral, written or other)
sought to be tendered.
Again, the significance of any applicable institutional rules
should not be overlooked. So Article 25(6) of the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules provides that the arbitral tribunal shall determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of
the evidence offered, and similar provisions are to be found in
Article 34(1) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, Article 22(1)(f) of
the LCIA Arbitration Rules and Article 20(6) of the American
Arbitration Association International Rules.
VI.

RESTRICTIONS ON JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AN
ARBITRAL AWARD

One of the undoubted advantages of arbitration is the
greater degree of finality that results from an arbitral award
than from a court judgment. It is much harder to have an arbi17 An out-of-court statement offered in evidence to show the truth of the facts
asserted in the statement.
1s The so-called "best evidence" rule.
19 Extrinsic evidence adduced to add to, contradict or vary the terms of a written contract. The parol evidence rule was traditionally formulated as one which
excluded oral (parol) evidence but in fact applies to any evidence, written or oral.
The rule is subject to numerous exceptions and has little to commend it.

7

PACE INT'L L. REV.

[Vol. 19:53

tral award set aside or varied in court proceedings than it is to
have a judgment upset or modified on an appeal to a higher
court. Thus in principle it is not a ground for setting aside an
award that the tribunal was guilty of errors of fact. However,
under US law, an award may be set aside for "manifest disregard of the law," that is, an intentional disregard of the law
agreed by the parties or found by the tribunal to be applicable,
where, if the law had been applied, it would have led to a different result,20 whilst English law allows an appeal on the grounds
of want of jurisdiction, serious procedural irregularity and error
of law, though in this last case only if the parties agree or the
court gives leave (which it cannot do unless various conditions
are satisfied) and the right of appeal has not been excluded by
21
agreement.
A distinctive feature of arbitration under the Arbitration
Rules of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) is that ICSID awards, though subject to
an internal annulment procedure by an ad hoc committee appointed in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Washington Convention, are immune from judicial review in every Contracting
22
State.
VII.

RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS

While there are only limited arrangements in force for the
international recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil
cases, 2 3 the position is otherwise in the case of international
commercial arbitration, which is governed by the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For20 In a recent decision, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the
"manifest disregard of the law" standard and held that the case fell far short of
what was required to show a breach of that standard: B L Harbert Int'l LLC v.
Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Eric D. Dunlop, Setting
Aside Arbitration Awards and the Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard, 80
FLA. B.J. 51 (2006).
21 Arbitration Act, 1996, 23, §§ 67-69 (Eng.).
22 Washington Convention, art. 53(1). The grounds for annulment are laid
down in art. 52(1) and are very restricted.
23 Within the European Community mutual recognition and enforcement are
provided by Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, Dec. 22, 2000 (commonly known
as "Brussels I") on the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. Outside the European Community, recognition and enforcement
are dependent on bilateral treaties.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol19/iss1/4

8

20071 DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS 61
eign Arbitral Awards, 24 which has been ratified by no fewer
than 137 states. Under the Convention, a party receiving an
arbitral award in one state is entitled, on complying with the
requisite formalities, to have the award recognized and enforced
in another state, provided that state is a party to the Convention. 25 Such recognition and enforcement may be refused only
in the restricted circumstances laid down in Article V.26
VIII.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DRAFTING OF
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

I have often felt that insufficient attention is given to dispute resolution clauses, which tend to be treated as boilerplate.
Typically, the parties opt either for litigation in a selected forum under an exclusive or non-exclusive jurisdiction clause or
for arbitration, often under institutional rules, by arbitrators
appointed pursuant to those rules or some other given procedure. However, at the time of their agreement the parties may
not be well placed to predict in advance the form of dispute resolution best suited to their case. It would often be preferable to
specify an interim procedure, such as negotiation followed by a
mechanism to determine the most appropriate means of resolving the dispute. But whatever procedure is agreed upon, it is
important, when drafting the dispute resolution clause, to take
into account the different ways in which, as described above,
the choice may impact on the parties' substantive rights.
So when an arbitration clause is being drafted the parties
need to consider to what extent they wish either to expand or to
constrain the powers of the arbitral tribunal. In particular,
should the tribunal be free to have recourse to soft law embodied in non-binding rules either to supplement or to supplant the
otherwise applicable law? Should the parties consider the inclusion of an express provision dispensing with strict rules of
evidence rather than leaving themselves in the hands of the arbitral tribunal? Should they not ensure, when adopting instituUnited Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
25 Id. arts. III, IV.
24

26 However, a state, when signing, ratifying or acceding to the Convention,
may declare that it will apply the Convention only to awards made in the territory

of another Contracting State. Id. art. 1(3).
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tional rules, that there are no default rules which need to be
excluded or varied? Moreover, in fixing the seat of the arbitration, the parties need to consider the law of the intended forum
governing judicial review and the extent to which they are content to have any award subjected to an appeal to the courts in
accordance with that law.
There is one final point. In some jurisdictions, such as
France, the courts consider that an award in an international
commercial arbitration is autonomous in character, so that
where, for example, the seat of the arbitration is Switzerland, a
French court is nevertheless entitled to enforce an arbitral
award that has been set aside by Switzerland's highest court
because the award, being international, is not "integrated into
the legal system" of Switzerland. 27 The parties need to consider
whether, in the interests of preserving the finality of the award,
which as noted earlier is one of the key attractions of arbitration, they should agree that no application will be made in a
foreign court to enforce an award set aside under the lex loci
arbitri.

27 Hilmarton Ltd. v. Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation (OTV), Cass.
le civ., Mar. 23, 1994, 1994 REV. ARB. 327. See also Pabalt Tikeret Sirketi v. Norsolor, Cass. le civ., Oct. 9, 1981, 1985 REV. ARB. 431; Polish Ocean Line v. Jolasry,
Cass. le civ. Mar. 10, 1993, 1993 REV. ARB. 255; Arab Republic of Egypt v. Chromalloy Air Services, CA, Paris, Jan. 14, 1997, 1997 REV. ARB. 395. See Roy Goode,
The Role of the Lex Loci Arbitri in InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 17 ARm.
INT. 19, 32-33 (2001) (provides a detailed criticism of the concept of delocalization
of the award reflected in these decisions).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol19/iss1/4

10

